How significantly do experiences and activities in infancy shape development in later life? Within the scope of these three global motivations to study babies, Development in Infancy examines the scientific progress being made in the study of infants.
Along the way, moreover, our text speaks to both lay curiosity and applied concerns. The goal of this chapter is to introduce our readers to the ma- jor theoretical and practical points that contrive to make infancy so fascinating a focus of research.
First, we turn our attention to the developmental signif- icance of infancy, or more specifically to relations between infancy and later phases of the lifespan, focusing on the debate between those who believe that infancy is part of a seamless or continuous lifeline and those who describe ma- jor discontinuities between infancy and later childhood or adolescence. We then address a core issue for developmentalists, the nature versus nurture debate, be- ginning with a discussion of long-established philosophical viewpoints on this issue and moving to various models of nature—nurture effects that have guided research and thinking about development in infancy.
Thereafter, we discuss sta- bility and continuity in infant development, taking note of the fact that these two terms do not mean the same thing, and relating the concepts of stability and continuity to questions about whether or not infant development proceeds in clear-cut stages.
We next describe some of the applied issues and questions that make the study of infancy important to those whose chief interests are the psychological, educational, public policy, and medical implications of variations in modern life, and then discuss interrelations among multiple aspects of devel- opment and the questions they provoke. Finally, we outline the contents of this book.
The Significance of Infancy There has been considerable debate about the long-term significance of develop- ment in infancy. Two extreme points of view vie for adherents. Proponents of one view believe that infancy is not particularly important because experiences in in- fancy have little if any long-term predictive significance.
Others argue that the experiences and behavior patterns developed in infancy are important in them- selves and are of crucial importance to later life.
Social orientations, motivations, and intellectual predilections established in infancy set lifelong patterns. The rationales that underpin this classical position are based on com- mon sense: The immature nervous system is thought to be especially plastic; neoteny the prolongation of infancy, especially in human beings is thought to have tremendous adaptive significance; the infant is thought to possess an ex- traordinary facility for learning and has few competing responses.
All of these factors imply that early experiences should disproportionately affect the course of subsequent development. Indeed, even folk wisdom and poetry have ex- pressed the conviction that infancy and experiences in early life are singularly important:. Arguments for the special importance of early experiences and early de- velopment were popular throughout the first half of the twentieth century and derived from a diverse array of theoretical starting points. Freud was by far the most prominent and vocal advocate of this position.
He was the first major theorist to focus attention on infancy, and he justified this focus by suggesting that the ways babies are treated establish lifelong orientations and personality traits. Freud proposed that there are critical phases in development during which certain sorts of experience—affecting specific types of traits—are of special significance.
Toward the end of infancy, Freud continued, the oral phase yields to the anal phase. During this pe- riod parent—infant interactions center on toilet training; long-term personality consequences associated with this phase are likely to involve stubbornness and obsessiveness. From early feeding experiences, he suggested, children develop a degree of trust or mistrust in the caregiver rather than concrete oral traits.
He also believed that the harmoniousness of early interactions i. With respect to toilet training, therefore, Erikson emphasized not the anal organs, but the status of toilet training as a battleground of wills as the child tries to exert initial control by determining when to give the parent the prize he or she seeks. First, Erikson por- trayed the lessons learned in each phase in more abstract, general terms e. Second, Erikson explicitly proposed that the ways in which different stages are resolved are somewhat interrelated.
Thus, initial mistrust may yield not only a mistrust- ful adult but one plagued by unsuccessful resolution of later developmental issues as well. Looking at an adult, it is not obvious that problems over inde- pendence issues i. Unfortunately, the ideas of Freud and his followers, including Erikson, were phrased in mentalistic terms that did not lend themselves to empirical evalua- tion. Behaviorists and learning theorists like Watson, Hull, and Miller dominated developmental psychology from the second to the sixth decade of the twentieth century.
Unlike Freud and Erikson, behaviorists eschewed the notions of stages and phases of devel- opment. For learning theorists, early experiences are important because they are first, have no competing propensities to replace, and thus yield easy and rapid learning. Moreover, early behavior patterns are believed to establish more complex behavior patterns such as personality traits. The ethologists and embryologists argue that there are predetermined periods in the maturation of organisms during which development is maximally sus- ceptible to influence by specific types of experiences see Bornstein, Just as Freud spoke of an oral phase during which feeding experiences have the greatest impact on the developing personality, the ethologists spoke of a critical or sensitive period for imprinting and for various other behavioral tendencies.
During such periods, lessons are learned more easily and endure longer than any that follow. Likewise, studies of embryological development have shown that some experiences will have no impact at one point, but devastating im- pact at another time. The sensitive-periods concept assigns great importance to early experiences because experiences oc- curring in infancy are likely to have long-lasting influence and because, once a particular period had passed, it is no longer possible for specific experiences to shape the developing organism.
Although this diverse group of theorists similarly but separately asserted the importance of early experiences for later development, popular commitment to the proposition developed as a result of some dramatic empirical observations published between and At that time, reports that children who were reared in impersonal institutions emerged psychologically stunted led to the widespread belief that children needed close relationships in infancy, and that the denial of such relationships would jeopardize their mental health Bowlby, ; Rutter, An additional perspective on the continuing importance of infancy was offered by students of cognitive and intellectual development.
Piaget theorized that all intellectual capacities are built on the simple devel- opments that take place very early in life, and thus that early experiences are of fundamental importance. Researchers found a very high degree of association between IQ scores obtained at 5 years of age and scores attained in adulthood. This claim is incorrect for a number of reasons; for example, correlations quantify the accuracy of prediction, not the amount of intelligence that has developed.
Nevertheless, the claim that experiences in infancy have a major impact on functioning in adulthood was convincing. By the early s, hardly anyone doubted that early experiences hold a special place in development. Two trends resulted: a massive increase in the amount of research on infancy and the first attempts to engineer enriching ex- periences for deprived children. More than anything else, the apparent failure of these interventions triggered a decline of confidence in the notion that early experiences were especially influential.
Most would agree that this failure was more apparent then real. Many researchers reported that the effects of educa- tional interventions on IQ scores were short-lived. Critics like Jensen thus argued that intervention programs had no sustainable benefits. Early enrichment programs were not failures, however.
Rather, it seems that the timing of intervention, the nature of intervention, and the selection of outcome variables are all important Guralnick, a, b; Hess, in press; Lamb, This conclusion emerges from long-term prospective studies of children who had either been enrolled in special enrichment programs or as- signed to control groups as infants or preschoolers. The outcomes measured in these studies included later school competence, and the results were quite impressive: Children in the experimental groups were less likely to be held back in school than controls, and they were less likely to need special education classes.
Once they are sensitized to the importance of helping their children succeed in preschool, for example, parents may maintain the impetus through the grade school and high school years. Proponents of Discontinuity Other theorists have, with equally compelling arguments, propounded an oppo- site view, namely that experiences in infancy are peripheral or ephemeral, in the sense that they have little or no enduring effect on development.
Instead, these individuals attribute the engine and controls of early development to biology and maturation. Gesell and Waddington , for example, believed that, like anatomy, the psychology of the individual unfolds on the basis of a maturing biological program undeflected by experience. Kagan came to argue that maturation—the unfolding of genetically determined capacities and individual differences—had been undervalued, pointing to research indicating that major differences in rearing environments had little apparent effect on the way children develop.
For example, he argued that daycare and home care have remarkably similar effects on developing infants Kagan et al. Kagan is not alone, however, in criticizing belief in the special formative importance of early experiences e. Claims that there is little continuity from early development and that be- havior patterns developed in infancy are unlikely to have predictable long-term consequences have attracted a great deal of attention.
In our view, such conclu- sions were inevitable, if erroneous, responses to earlier simplistic notions about the formative importance of infant experiences and inadequate attention to the potential for remediation. The major difficulty lies in overreliance on linear models of development holding that early experiences have obvious and direct short- and long-term effects.
However, simple linear relations between early experiences and later development are seldom substantiated empirically see Sroufe, ; Thompson, The Transactional View The linear model is inadequate, therefore, not the notion that experiences whether early or late affect later development.
In place of the linear model, Sameroff and Chandler proposed a transactional model of development. From this perspective, it is naive to expect any single experience to have direct long-term effects, for its impact will be diffuse, triggering indirect effects e.
Nevertheless, events in infancy are important because they initiate multiple developmental processes. Consider the concrete example that Sameroff and Chandler articu- lated when proposing this model. Years of research on prematurity showed that only a minority of preterm babies develop abnormally even though initially they may be indistinguishable from preterm infants who later develop quite ade- quately. Prematurity per se does not necessarily have ill effects, Sameroff and Chandler argued, but parents cope with atypical babies in different ways.
Some fail to provide the types of experiences that preterm children need in order to off- set their potential for developmental delay, and preterm infants are at risk over the long term only if they are reared in such environments.
Since linear models typically focus on main effects or individual factors such as prematurity , it is not surprising that their predictive power is poor. For this reason, it is unlikely that researchers will be able to identify specific early experiences that directly shape later characteristics. In our opinion, the transactional model is greatly superior to the linear effects model, and for this reason among others we believe that it is important to study development in infancy.
Grossmann and Grossmann illustrated transac- tional processes using data gathered in their longitudinal study of infant—mother attachment. The good orienters were those who were attentive to both social i. Viewed together, these findings suggest that the characteristics of the baby and the characteristics of the mother jointly determined what sort of relationship they formed, just as Sameroff and Chandler predicted.
Chapter 2. The social context, broadly defined in this way, naturally influences formative transactional processes, and this raises important questions about continuity and prediction. For example, there is growing evidence that warm, nurturant, attentive, stimulating, and nonrestrictive mothers tend to have babies who at 1 year of age display behavior that Ainsworth see Chapter 11 identified as secure i.
This fact raises questions about the nature of consistency and prediction from infancy. Specifically, if secure infants con- stantly receive high quality care from their parents, the quality of care may be the real determinant of long-term prediction, not the security of early infant—mother attachment. Direct predictions do exist too, however. Researchers initially studied cog- nitive stability by examining statistical associations between scores on stan- dardized tests of infant development mostly comprising sensorimotor items and standardized tests of cognitive performance in childhood.
No stability was found, and it was often concluded that one could not predict levels of later per- formance from measures of cognitive functioning in infancy. As Bornstein showed, however, measures of infant habituation the rate of response decre- ment following repeated presentations of a stimulus and recovery of attention to a new stimulus uniquely predict scores on intelligence tests in childhood moderately well, even with the contributions of the intervening experiences statistically controlled for.
Infants who show efficient decrement or recovery of attention in the first 6 months of life later between 2 and 12 years of age perform better on traditional assessments of cognitive competence, including measures of language ability and standardized psychometric tests of intelligence. This stability has been reported by many different researchers using different mea- sures of different sensory modalities, so it appears to be a robust pattern.
In short, there is clear evidence of consistency from infancy in cognitive as well as socioemotional spheres of life. In sum, by studying infancy we learn about processes and experiences that have long-term implications for development.
Infancy is the first phase of our lives, and the characteristics we develop and acquire then are fundamental; they are the characteristics that endure and those that later experiences build on or modify. Infancy is only one phase in the lifespan, however, and so our cognitive competencies, social styles, and personalities are also shaped by our experiences and development after infancy.
The start does not fix the course or outcome of development, but it clearly exerts an impact on both. Heredity and Experience Traditionally, theory and research in infancy are designed to evaluate when a structure or function emerges, the course of its development that is, whether and how it changes with age , and what factors influence its development. Certain overriding philosophical issues concerning the origins of knowledge and the course of development also recur, however, and we now turn to them.
Past, Present, and Future Historically, the study of development in infancy has been driven by questions concerning the roles of heredity and experience. This debate pitted against one another two groups of philosophers who were interested in epistemology, under- standing where knowledge comes from and how it grows. Extreme views were put forward by nativists on the one hand and by empiricists on the other; these two positions define the classic confrontation between proponents of nature and proponents of nurture.
The debate is age-old, but it experienced a striking philosophical upsurge in the seventeenth century. Empiricists asserted that there is no endowed knowledge at birth, that all knowledge comes through the senses, and that mental development reflects learned associations.
Against the empiricists, nativists asserted that the mind naturally, and from the beginning of life, imposes order on sensory input, automatically transforming raw sensations into meaningful perceptions. According to nativists, infants and adults share the same perceptual capacities and therefore perceive the world in much the same way. Because nativist theory postulates that many such abilities are present at birth it is not particularly developmental, although it does acknowledge that certain abilities take time to mature.
Although the nature—nurture debate is centuries old, its central issues have remained basic to the study of infancy into our own time. Observing the status and origins of behavior and the dramatic developmental processes that occur in infancy motivates scholars to ask about the sources of change, and attempts at answers inevitably lead to speculations about heredity and experience, nature and nurture.
It seems reasonable in this connection to let more modern American theorists speak for themselves, for they give us the best flavor of their views on the origins and determinants of life in infancy.
Thus, Gesell , p. The so- called environment, whether internal or external, does not generate the progression of development. Environmental factors support, inflect, and specify, but they do not engender the basic forms and sequences of ontogenesis. Interest in innate biological motives and constraints on infant development continues today in many quarters e.
Many scientists still believe that the environment is the principal determinant of development from infancy e. The left half of Figure 1. Similarly, if the constitution of the organism was bad, the outcome would be bad, regardless. After Sameroff, By contrast, the nurturist main effects model predicts that, if the environment is good, the outcome will be good, regardless of the constitution.
In more contemporary times, a gradual shift in orientation can be discerned in the skirmishes between those who emphasized biological, endogenous, or maturationist determinants of development on the one hand and those who em- phasized experiential, exogenous, or environmental determinants on the other.
Unlike main effects proponents, interactionists offered an additive view, in which nature and nurture were believed to interact together to shape development.
Thus, as shown in Figure 1. Piaget , for example, emphasized such interac- tions between heritability and maturationism on the one hand and experience and environmentalism on the other. Although vastly different, we can see that Gesell, Watson, and Piaget all conceived of development as a static interaction between two life forces— heredity and experience.
Many early developmental scientists particularly those in psychobiology and ethology argued that inherited constitution and experienced environment mutually influence one another during the course of development see Gottlieb, ; Hinde, Sameroff and Chandler rec- ognized that inherent characteristics are shaped by experience and vice versa, and that a constant process of mutual influence between heredity and experience continues throughout infancy, and indeed the lifespan.
Figure 1. This was a very important advance, for it opened up the probability of epigenesis, the hypothesis that new phenomena not present in the original fertilized egg can emerge over the course of development through the interaction of preexisting elements with environmental influences. The transactional view is now widely adopted in infancy research.
It holds that at any point in infancy the effects of an experience depend on the nature of the specific experience and the constitutional endowment of the infant. Infancy is therefore important to those interested in long-term prediction, even if the effects of experiences in infancy are neither obvious nor direct. We will return to this issue in our discussion of the debate between the proponents of continuity and discontinuity in development.
Like most contemporary students of development in infancy, our own per- spective is one that emphasizes the ways in which heredity and experience code- termine the development of the individual. Infants are born with simple yet important behavioral proclivities; these innate tendencies help to direct early de- velopment by delimiting the potential for behavior change through experience.
Babies who are congenitally distractible, for example, are likely to learn slowly about objects they see or hear because they are unable to attend to or to concen- trate on them for long periods. Patient parenting may help offset this tendency. On the other hand, infants are born into worlds that meet their needs and pro- vide influential experiences; these external possibilities also help to direct early development. A baby who is congenitally attentive is likely to learn slowly if reared in a stark and solitary environment.
A change in environment may help to overcome this disadvantage. Neither biological predispositions nor experiences alone determine the course, direction, termination, or final resting level of development; rather, these life forces influence one another as development proceeds.
As will become clear in this text, we are interested in learning which experiences affect what aspects of development when and how, the ways in which individual children are so affected, as well as the ways in which individual children affect their own development. Some Specific Mechanisms of Heredity and Experience Two kinds of biologically based tendencies figure prominently in our discus- sions.
Species-typical tendencies are those that all humans share. Just as some of us have blue eyes and others have green eyes, so some infants seem to be inherently more irritable i. Both species-typical and heritable tendencies exert important influences on development. The fact that infants are genetically biased to behave in certain ways means that the paths along which they develop are not exclusively determined by the ex- periences others provide for them.
Indeed, infants are active and contribute to their own development. Their characteristics and propensities can influence the experiences they will be exposed to and the ways in which those experiences affect them.
This view is an essential component of the transactional approach. In addition, most developmental scientists now believe that the ways in which different individuals understand the world represent an important subjective or phenomenological synthesis of what they learn from their unique interactions and experiences. For example, students of cognitive development propose that infants develop an understanding of the world by interpreting their perceptions and the effects of their own actions.
Unfortunately, there is often some confusion about these biological influ- ences. Three false beliefs are especially common: One is the notion that behaviors with a biological origin are fixed and thus cannot be affected by experience. The second issue is the belief that biologically determined propensities must be present at birth.
To discount this belief we need simply point to biologically determined events that directly and indirectly affect psychological development, yet do not occur until many years after birth. Puberty, for example, is a major milestone in biological and psychoso- cial development, yet it typically begins a decade after birth. The third myth is the assumption that biologically based behaviors must remain stable over time and are not susceptible to change. In fact, some proclivities or tendencies change in childhood, either in response to particular experiences or as a result of genet- ically preprogrammed variations.
Thus, both heritable and species-typical traits can be shaped by experience. As far as experiential or environmental influences are concerned, there are several key facets to which developmentalists must attend: They include source, action, and timing.
Behavioral geneticists such as Plomin and Turkheimer and Waldron have identified several sources of environmental experi- ence, distinguishing the shared from the nonshared environment. The shared environment is clear; the nonshared environment consists of environmental dif- ferences acting on individuals in the same situation or setting.
In their view, the nonshared environment may be nonsystematic, or it may be systematic. Nonsystematic events include accidents, illness, or other chance circumstances that contribute to individual differences and that influence individual devel- opment. By contrast, systematic nonshared influences include gender differ- ences, birth order, differential treatment by family, and similar family or social factors. Second, Gottlieb suggests a useful distinction among several different actions of experience.
Induction is the most dramatic form of influence. It occurs when a particular experience or set of experiences completely determines whether a structure or function emerges.
Without the experience, there will be no emer- gence or development of the structure or function. Attunement or facilitation occurs when certain experiences speed up or slow down the development of structures or functions. Finally, maintenance describes a situation in which ex- perience preserves already partially or fully developed structures or functions. In the case of partial or full development, the absence of experience will result in loss of the structure or function.
In addition to source and action, the timing of experience appears to be im- portant. By way of example, consider two models of how caregiving may affect development. In one model, an experience provided by the caregiver uniquely affects the infant at a particular time point, with effects that endure independent of later experiences or events. This model is consonant with a sensitive-period interpretation of experience effects e.
A given ex- perience may exert no influence on development at one time; at another it may exert a profound effect; and at a third again no effect. Alternatively, the care- giving experience may influence development only because it is consistent and thus has a cumulative impact e. Of course, there is nothing to prevent both the sensitive period and cumulative impact interpretations from operating in different spheres of infant development.
If a structure or function is undeveloped at the time of the onset of experience, experience may induce the structure or function; without experience, the structure or function will not develop. If a structure or function is only partially developed, experience may maintain the structure or function at that level or attune or facilitate its further development.
If the structure or function is fully developed, experience would serve to maintain it. In the case of partially or fully developed structure or function, the lack of experience could eventuate in loss of structure or function. After Aslin, b.
In Chapter 3, concerned with methods, we discuss strategies and techniques developmental scientists use to understand and differentiate hereditary and experiential influences on development in infancy. One such strategy pits in- fants born at term with those born preterm, because one is then able to compare differential development in the context of equivalent postnatal experience.
A second strategy, one which we highlight in all parts of Development in Infancy, is cross-cultural comparison. The reasons to conduct cross-cultural developmental research with infants are many. People are perennially curious about infant development in other cultures, and social anthropological inquiry has almost always, as a matter of course, included reports of infant life.
Insofar as cross-cultural descriptions of infancy attempt to encompass the widest spectrum of human variation, they are the most com- prehensive, and they are therefore vital to delimiting the full range of human experience and establishing valid developmental norms. Cross-cultural devel- opmental inquiry provides natural tests of the universality of certain scientific constructs. In particular, this approach helps us understand the parts played by culture-dependent and culture-independent forces in shaping the origins, status, and development of diverse structures and functions through development see Bornstein, b; Cole, Clearly, many of the reasons that motivate cross-cultural developmental research with infants are descriptive, but cross-cultural studies also affect the development of theory.
Stability and Continuity Beyond questions of heredity and experience, developmental scientists often ask about the extent to which infant behavior and development are consistent and stable over time. The term stability is used to describe consistency over time in the relative ranking of individuals in a group on some dimension or aspect of de- velopment.
Activity level in infants would be stable, for example, if some infants are more active than others when they are young and continue to be more active than others when they are older. A related but separate concept is continuity. The term continuity is used to describe consistency in average group score on some dimension over time. Thus, for example, activity level would be deemed to show continuity if a group of infants were approximately as active when they were young and when they were older.
An additional concrete example may help to illustrate these points. Bornstein and Tamis-LeMonda examined stability and continuity in the activities of mothers toward their firstborn infants between the time their babies were 2 months and 5 months of age. A majority of maternal activities were stable, some maternal activities showed continuity, whereas some increased and others decreased over time.
Table 1. Interestingly, every cell in the table mentions a significant maternal activity. Some maternal activities, like total maternal speech, proved stable and continuous. Between the times when the infants were 2 and 5 months of age, Table 1. TABLE 1. Other maternal activities were stable and discontinuous, showing either general developmental increases e.
Some maternal activities were unsta- ble and continuous e. Unfortunately, development often makes it difficult to tell whether funda- mental change has occurred in an underlying construct such as attachment, imitation, or fear , or whether there is simply some superficial change in the way in which an unchanging construct is expressed.
Again, the distinction is best illustrated by example. By contrast, 9-month-olds may express affection for their parents by clinging, crying, and asking to be held; one year later, signals like talking and smiling may have become more common ways to express attachment; and fifteen years later, letters may be used.
These developmental changes do not necessarily mean that attachments have changed in strength; they may simply indicate that different means have been found to mediate emotional relationships. We can distinguish among types of stability or continuity more formally by describing three models of the possible association among variables. One model describes a homotypic stability of the same underlying aspect of development. Another model describes heterotypic stability as expressed in physically different but conceptually similar dimensions.
Heterotypic associations may be concurrent or lagged. Individual Variation and Normative Development Two broad classes of questions arise in connection with issues of stability and continuity in infancy.
One asks about normative development, attempting to discern and describe aspects of development in all babies at specific ages or in specific circumstances.
The other focuses on individual variation in levels of structure or function, attempting to discern, describe, and perhaps explain the differences among individuals.
A Developmental functions for six individual infants; as can be seen, each infant develops in a stepwise fashion. B A continuous function is created by averaging the six individual functions. Often, continuous developmental functions accurately represent the group as well as individual data.
Here, however, averaging across individuals yields a deceptively continuous group function. A developmental function reflects the changing value of a group on a given attribute across age. This function defines species-typical development without regard to individual differences, and may be continuous or discontinuous that is, stage- like. By contrast, a study of individual variation seeks to ascertain information about differences at any one age and to determine whether those differences among individuals in a group remain ordered in the course of development.
Child care and culture: Lessons from Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press. Child-parent attachment following early institutional deprivation. Development and Psychopathology, 15, Sen, M. Perception, 30, Van Ijzendoorn, M. Cross-cultural patterns of attachment. Shaver Eds. New York: Guilford. Webb, S. Mechanisms of postnatal neurobiological development: Implications for human development. Developmental Neuropsychology, 19, This fourth edition of the best-selling topically-organized introduction to infancy reflects the enormous changes that have occurred in our understanding of infants and their place in human development over the past decade.
Each chapter has been thoroughly revised to reflect current thinking and research in the field, and while classic studies continue to be cited, the tex This fourth edition of the best-selling topically-organized introduction to infancy reflects the enormous changes that have occurred in our understanding of infants and their place in human development over the past decade. Each chapter has been thoroughly revised to reflect current thinking and research in the field, and while classic studies continue to be cited, the text emphasizes studies published since the late s.
The authors have worked to maintain the readability for which this classic textbook has been known. This edition continues to be appropriate for use in classes at all levels--undergraduate and graduate--as well as in various disciplines--psychology, education, child development, nursing, and social work. Get A Copy. Paperback , 4th Edition , pages. More Details Original Title. Other Editions Friend Reviews.
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Start your review of Development in Infancy: An Introduction. I swear just about every single chapter or several times in a chapter they discussed how difficult infants are to study. I think we all inherently understand that infants cannot articulate their understanding of their environment say it once and move on! That and did we mention infants don't make good test subjects?!? Seriously we got it! Jen rated it really liked it Jun 25, Shena rated it liked it Apr 11,
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